全球经济危机的教训

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 WE NEED A BETTER CUSHION AGAINST RISK
 The extraordinary risk-management discipline that developed out of the writings of the University of Chicago's Harry Markowitz in the 1950s produced insights that won several Nobel prizes in economics. It was widely embraced not only by academia but also by a large majority of financial professionals and global regulators.
 
 But in August 2007, the risk-management structure cracked. All the sophisticated mathematics and computer wizardry essentially rested on one central premise: that the enlightened self- interest of owners and managers of financial institutions would lead them to maintain a sufficient buffer against insolvency by actively monitoring their firms' capital and risk positions. For generations, that premise appeared incontestable but, in the summer of 2007, it failed. It is clear that the levels of complexity to which market practitioners, at the height of their euphoria, carried risk-management techniques and risk-product design were too much for even the most sophisticated market players to handle prudently.
 
 全球经济危机的教训
 上世纪50年代从芝加哥大学(University of Chicago)的哈里·马科维茨(Harry Markowitz)著作中发展起来的非常风险管理理论产生了真知灼见，后来多次赢得了诺贝尔经济学奖。这个理论不仅为学术界所接受，也为绝大多数金融专业人士及全球监管部门广泛接纳。
 
 但2007年8月，风险管理框架出现了裂痕。所有先进的数学和计算机法术本质上都依赖于一个核心前提：金融机构所有人和管理人开明的利己做法将积极监视公司资产和风险仓位，从而导致他们保持足够缓冲以应对破产。数代人以来，这似乎是颠扑不破的前提，却在2007年夏季破灭了。市场运作者在十分乐观时，将风险管理技术和风险产品设计做得十分复杂，即便是最成熟的市场参与者，也过繁复以至于无法审慎处理。
 
 即便是自我监管崩溃，即便抵御危机的第二道防线——我们的监管体系有效运作，金融体系当初也应当抱成一团。但在危机的压力下，它同样失效了。仅仅一年前，美国联邦储蓄保险公司(the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)曾指出，“全部被保险的机构中超过99%达到或超过了资本金标准的最高监管要求”。美国银行受到广泛的监管，即便我们最大的10到15家银行机构仍有永久指派的现场监测人监督日常运营，仍有许多这样的银行仍然接受了令其一蹶不振的有毒资产。英国饱受赞誉的金融服务局(Financial Services Authority)没能预见并防止威胁北岩银行(Northern Rock)生存的挤兑。代表全球主要金融体系监管机构的巴塞尔委员会，颁布了一套没能预见2007年8月引发对大量资金缓冲需求的资本规定。
 

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